

**The European Union's Strategic compass – a new strategic approach
for CSDP or just a reaction based on a war in the neighbourhood?**

Essay

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Abstract

In March 2022, the Council of the EU approved the Strategic Compass, which is defined as an ambitious plan to strengthen the EU Security and Defence Policy by 2030. The project sees the light a few days after the predicted return of the "old style" warfare in the Old Continent. Today the question arises whether the SC is a new strategic approach for CSDP or merely a reaction to the conflict in the neighbouring region.

This study seeks to address this question by comparing official documents released by the EU with publications from the most authoritative national and international scholars. The research focuses on historical analysis from 1992 to present, highlighting the political differences among member states, particularly in their interpretation of "threat". It also examined industrial defence policies and briefly explored the limitations associated with CSDP missions.

Although the SC introduces elements of innovation and progress, the research reveals that it still suffers from the same limitations that have plagued the CSDP since its inception. These limitations will be further elaborated upon in the subsequent sections.

Keywords

1. Threat
2. Partner
3. Limitations
4. Strategy
5. non-Europe

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2. Preface

The world is at a turning point. The international relations established after the fall of the Berlin Wall have been disrupted more than ever today. Europe, as it has been at various times in its history, is called upon to respond to these sudden changes. The situation has worsened with the rekindling of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has once again entered a violent phase involving neighbouring nations, further destabilising the Middle East. Is the EU ready for changes on the international geopolitical scene?

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU presents itself today with its weapon against old, new, and future threats: the EU's Strategic Compass. In essence, is it a reaction to the current international situation, or is it the beginning of a radical change in European thinking regarding the challenges of the 21st century? The question that arises is precisely this and will be the centre of gravity of the elaborate. There is no absolute answer, as many contemporary scholars and thinkers have provided valuable insights into the situation and potential developments. Among these, we would like to extend our personal thanks for the provision of specialised documentation to the distinguished Giuseppe Romeo and Paolo Caraffini, professors associated with the UNITO (Italy) and profound connoisseurs of the subject, with whom we have collaborated on numerous academic initiatives.

The key points on which the following pages will focus will be a thorough examination of the SC, reviewing the highlights of recent history and the behaviour of European institutions in the face of crises. Subsequently, attention will shift to one of the underlying factors contributing to the seemingly insurmountable divisions among the 27 members: the varying strategic cultures of each nation. In addition, a response that takes into account the very nature of this report and its military aspects must also take into account the defence industry and the EU's international (both military and civilian) missions. It is essential for every citizen of the Union and the public, who are now more than ever besieged by misinformation propagated through the media, to understand that the security of individual member states comes through the security of the EU itself and its partners.

3. Introduction

Who does the EU aspire to be on the international stage? The EU-formulated LOA defines the aims and objectives to be achieved. The Union's efforts from 2020 to 2022 focused on redefining the ambitions provided by the 2016 Global Strategy. This challenge culminated with the introduction of the SC, defined by the incumbent HR/VP Josep Borrell as a guideline for implementing the EU's security and defence agenda.

More than a year after its approval, one might wonder whether the SC marks a real turning point in the European mindset or whether it is merely another response to the current crisis, as has occurred repeatedly since the end of the Second World War. In 2022, when Borrell spoke of "*rising threats and the cost of inaction*"¹, public opinion was largely focused on the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Echoing the thoughts of the HR of the CSDP, the European Union has demonstrated unprecedented unity and courage by providing logistical and economic support to Kyiv and imposing sanctions on Moscow. However, the geopolitical situation has worsened since Borrell introduced the SC. New conflicts have emerged, such as the stalemate of what has become a war of attrition in Ukraine, which severely tests the logistical reserves of the West and the industrial capacity to support Kyiv, the coup states of the Sahel, Erdogan's aggressive Turkish policy, tensions on the Kosovo-Serbia border and, a renewed Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These tensions are familiar to Brussels, but this time they have appeared simultaneously, encircling the EU as in a pincer manoeuvre, pressing on the very foundation of the organisation. This current unstable geopolitics allows both state and non-state actors to exploit the cracks of the system, the power gaps left by the immobility of international actors, as well as the flaws of international law, thus expanding the sphere of influence to the detriment of Europeans.

Before answering the question above, it is necessary to shed light on the reality of the situation by underlining the divisions that the EU should address, preferring a political pragmatism that is more imperative now than ever. The SC seems mired in political intricacies rather than answering the challenging questions that could reveal a general and practical perspective on the EU's security and defence threats. In fact, within the

¹ Cf.: Cit. acc. to. Borrell, J. (2022) – A Strategic Compass for security and defence. Document for Observers

text, one can observe the arduous and long bureaucratic process that has stripped it of any reference to the great original ideas (for example, the much acclaimed "Strategic Autonomy" only appears once in the final text)². This historic moment is followed by a debate among the members on future enlargement where, once again, divisions emerge that could lead to the failure of the "Compass". The purpose of this paper is to provide an objective answer by showing what actions or divisions at present could nullify two years of work on the SC.

² Cf.: Cit. acc. to. Sabtino, E. & Fiott, D. (2020) – The Quest for European Strategic Autonomy – A Collective Reflection. Istituto Affari Internazionali. Document for observers

4. Current State of Research

Many military officials and experts have pondered the changes that the guidelines outlined in the SC will bring to Europe and the world. More than a year has passed since its approval and the first results can be observed, while others are too premature to be quantified or discussed. The experts have mainly focused on the following macro-areas, which will be explored in this study:

- NATO-EU relations in European security;
- The Impact of PESCO and EDF in the Defence Industry;
- The Effectiveness of CSDP/ESDP missions;

4.1 NATO-EU relations in European security

After a comprehensive strategic review following the fall of the USSR and years of commitment to peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, the Atlantic Alliance has recently undergone a significant redefinition of its *raison d'être* in an anti-Chinese key. This strategic vision has led to a shift of the Alliance's centre of gravity in the Indo-Pacific region. The outbreak of armed conflict in Ukraine and the rekindling of the Israeli-Palestinian question have brought these issues back into the spotlight, which NATO (and the US, in particular) had previously downplayed.

In the SC, in the section titled "Partners", there is a clear reference to NATO as "*the first foundation of the collective defence of its members*"³. Moreover, according to the SC, the EU's defence policy is complementary to NATO, and at the same time, the Union strives for decision-making independence. The basis of this statement can be found in both the approved text of the SC and the NATO Strategic Concept 2022.

³ Nato's Heads of State and Government (29 June 2022). NATO 2022 Strategic Concept. Madrid. Document for the Observers.

4.2 The Impact of PESCO and EDF in the Defence Industry

The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), activated with the December 2017 Council, aims to enhance cooperation in the field of defence among EU members. What differentiates PESCO from any other form of cooperation is its legally binding nature for those who choose to join. There are currently 68 active projects, and they are carried out by a coordinating country and other voluntary participants. In the list, there are important names like the future AIFV⁴. While it is true that these proposals are adopted by a qualified majority, the voting system within PESCO is unanimous. Therefore, the more members join, the greater the investments are potentially affecting cohesion.

In addition, in June 2018 the European Commission presented a proposal for the establishment of a fund aimed at promoting innovation capacity. In March 2021, the Council adopted this position by institutionalising the European Defence Fund (EDF). Initially, the fund amounted to EUR 11.5 billion, which was later reduced to only EUR 8 billion for the period 2021-2027⁵, for supporting defence projects, primarily under the CSDP.

The relationship between the two main EU mechanisms for the integrated development of national military instruments and individual initiatives, as well as the long and short-term projects initiated by EU member states will be investigated in this paper. The sources on which this analysis will be based are the documents produced by European institutions (such as the Annual Report on the CSDP 2022).

⁴ Homepage of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Page Policies. URL: <https://www.pesco.europa.eu/>

⁵ C. Acc. to. Freyrie, M. (2023) – Italy Punches Below Its Weight on the European Defence Fund. Istituto Affari Internazionali. Dissertation.

4.3 The Effectiveness of CSDP/ESDP Missions

The SC has been organised into four pillars: Acting, Safe, Investing, and Partner. In particular, the pillar "Act" deals with developing the EU's ability to decide and act in a coordinated and effective manner. This includes the EU Rapid Deployable Capability, which enables the deployment of a modular force up to 5,000 units, and the MPCC, which is responsible for planning and conducting all non-executive military missions as well as two small-scale or one medium-scale executive operations as well as live exercises. Moreover, among other initiatives and novelties, the intention to increase CSDP missions and the EU's maritime presence finds space.

The latter has a legal basis dating back to the C.D. Berlin Plus Treaties and the 1992 Petersberg package. These missions are essentially of three types: humanitarian and relief missions, peacekeeping activities, and combat unit missions in crisis management, which include peace-making missions⁶. Since 2003, the EU has launched over 30 CSDP missions, with eleven civilian missions and seven military missions currently active. In this context, scholars focus on the actual effectiveness of the EU security missions launched to date. Furthermore, they are exploring the distinctions between the EU's Rapid Deployable Capability and the so-called "Battlegroups", which were highlighted by the Security Council in June 2020 as underutilized.

⁶ Ronzitti, N. (2005) – The European Union's Peacekeeping Forces. pp. 49-79. Document for Observers.

5. Research Gap

At present, the research gaps that can be addressed concern several areas. First, the current decision-making structure of the CSDP, including the Council of the EU and the European External Action Service, adapts to the need to respond flexibly to the new security challenges identified in the SC. This gap is transversal in terms of the development of PESCO projects, the access to EDF, and the launch of European international missions. Second, a possible research area results in how CSDP will align the SC with the actions of individual members to reach a common LOA. The question in this case is whether inconsistencies arise between the actions of the members and the SC. Ultimately, there is the role that the EU wants SC to play in resolving conflicts if its guidelines will be effective tools to hold onto to have a leading role in the international arena.

6. Research Questions

1. What was the impact of the FED and PESCO on defence? How do you explain the projects undertaken by some members?
2. Do the recently strengthened EU-NATO relations converge with European plans?
3. Has the European CFSP mission model been effective? Is the strengthening of such operations consistent with European ambitions?

7. Methodology

Based on concrete data and actions of the individual states, supporting the thesis with official documents and the opinions of the most influential experts in the field, it has tried to outline the ineffective action carried out by the EU and its members since the approval of the SC to date. The starting point for exposing this line of thought was to investigate the meaning of "threat" for the EU and for individual members, then move on to the contradiction of how the EU-NATO relationship, according to the SC, is complementary (balanced breakdown) and the EU wants to maintain decision-making autonomy. Still, at the same time, the Atlantic Alliance remains the cornerstone of the defence of EU countries. In conclusion, after dealing briefly with the EU missions, it will be clear to the reader what aspects the EU is trying to work on, but the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP severely limits the institution's action. In short, what Altiero Spinelli, one of the fathers of the modern EU, said in the middle of the last century will be brought to the surface: security and defence demands the State.

8. Research and Results of Research

8.1 The Cost of non-Europe Defence and the Meaning of Threat

8.1.1 PESCO and EFD Impact

European defence is more urgent than ever. The arms and defence market has been excluded from the process leading to the establishment of the single market. In fact, despite the various initiatives art. 346 (ex-Art. 296 TEC) of the Treaty of Lisbon remains and establishes that:

(a) *no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security;*

(b) *any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, Munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes.*

It is therefore obvious that the EU Member States, using the definition of "national interest", have de facto prevented the establishment of an integrated defence market. The multiplication of weapon systems that has resulted has determined a level of waste each year, whose difficult theoretical calculation brings it to about 120 billion euros⁷. Another 2019 EPRS study estimates the likely savings of "non-European" at 22.15 billion euros. One might be led to think that the period 2013-2019 with the advent of some structures has rationalized defence spending. A careful reading however leads to a substantial difference, that is the EPRS is based exclusively on the fields of Investment and Infrastructure, personnel, Operation and maintenance (Figure 1)⁸, obviously giving the solutions that could bring effective savings. Therefore, the expenses that are required by 27 national defence systems against the single system proposed in the 2013 study remain outside.

⁷ European Common Security and Defence Policy (2013) - Cost of Non-Europe Report. Dissertation.

⁸ European Parliamentary Research Service (2019) - Europe's two trillion euro dividend: Mapping the Cost of Non-Europe, 2019-24. Document for Observers.

Area of cost reduction	Annual cost reduction	Action leading to potential reduction ⁹⁹⁹
Investment and Infrastructure	€7.4 bn	European Defence Fund and Military Mobility
Personnel	€6.5 bn	Potential land forces reduction due to increased coordination at EU level
Operation and maintenance	€8.25 bn	Potential savings from joint public procurement and common performance management
Total	€22.15 bn	

Figure 1. Possible areas for defence cooperation and their corresponding cost reduction.

The other side of the coin that affects the effectiveness of PESCO and EDF is the limit of unanimity. While it is true to say that there are as many as 68 PESCO projects approved by qualified majority, the voting system within it is unanimous. Therefore, more members joining means more investments, but the detriment of cohesion. In addition, in March 2021 the Council institutionalised the EDF. Initially, the amount was €11.5 billion, then reduced to just €7 billion for the period 2021-2027, for defence projects, primarily under the CSDP, out of a total expenditure budget of €214 billion⁹. To overcome these limitations, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the implementation of the "*Bridging Clauses*" which "*should be used to switch to qualified majority voting in specific areas of the CSDP*", however, this does not apply to cooperation on defence matters like PESCO.¹⁰

8.1.2 The Threat and members' actions

The term "threat" is often used in the SC and for the success of an effective European policy, the meaning should be shared by all members. However, by observing the strategic doctrines of individual member countries, one can denote completely different, sometimes dissonant, words, and postures¹¹.

⁹ EDA defence DATA 2021.

¹⁰ Servizio Studi Ufficio Politica Estera e Difesa (2023) - Conferenza interparlamentare sulla politica estera e di sicurezza comune (PESC) e sulla politica di sicurezza e di difesa comune (PSDC). Madrid. Document for Observers.

¹¹ Fiot, D. (2020) – Uncharted territory? Towards a common threat analysis and a Strategic Compass for EU security and defence. Institute for Security Studies. Dissertation




Figure 2 indicates in individual national strategies what is labelled as a threat by EU members.¹²

If you look at the graph that shows what are labelled as "threats" in every national doctrine and by the EU, there is a trend according to which there is a disagreement between members on what is a "threat" and what is not.

Specifically, we should analyse which members have defined Moscow in these terms and the security policies they have adopted in recent years: Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the Netherlands. There are interconnections between what is labelled as a threat and government policies. In general, these are North-Eastern European nations, probably justified by historical reasons. Poland is one of the countries that far exceeds the threshold of 2% of GDP for defence expenditure, is always reluctant to a European defence project, strong of a special relationship with the USA¹². To confirm this, Warsaw has signed a billionaire agreement with the United States to supply 116 M1A1 Abrams by the end of 2024 and another with South Korea for K2 tanks. By identifying Russia as a threat, knowing the historic conventional power of the Russian army, Poland is investing in strengthening its armoured units, to the detriment of European ad hoc structures.

¹² Cristiani, D. & Alcaro, R. (2023) – Focus euroatlantico. Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Volume 1/2023.

8.2 EU-NATO Cooperation

"NATO remains the foundation of collective defence for its allies and essential for Euro-Atlantic security. We recognise the value of a stronger and more capable European defence that contributes positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary and interoperable with NATO." ¹³

"Cooperation between the EU and NATO is now the norm and the daily practice and continues to take place on the basis of fundamental guiding principles: openness, transparency, inclusiveness and reciprocity, while fully respecting the decision-making autonomy and procedures of both organisations, without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any Member State." ¹⁴

Analysing the reality of the above statements and putting the SC in place with the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, it emerges that the EU Defence Policy is subordinate to NATO. Furthermore, in none of the joint declarations is there a firm description of what posture to hold in relation to certain conflicts between EU members and NATO members, for example between Cyprus and Turkey. The Atlantic Alliance does not include some members of the EU who, by historical neutrality, have not joined NATO, such as Austria.

To be able to foresee whether cooperation on an equal footing between the two international actors can exist, it is necessary to observe the Force Relations within them, which reflect the specific weight on the international level.

1. *"As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance"*¹⁵. The main difference between NATO and the EU is nuclear power, almost exclusively in the hands of the US. The only member country of both that can exercise nuclear deterrence is France, this privilege offers a position of advantage even within the same European institutions, but not sufficient when compared with Russia and China (Figure 3).

¹³ Brussels (2023). Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation.

¹⁴ Homepage of EEAS. Page EU-NATO cooperation – Factsheets. URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-nato-cooperation-factsheets_en

¹⁵ Nato's Heads of State and Government (29 June 2022). NATO 2022 Strategic Concept. Madrid. Document for the Observers.




Figure 3. Global nuclear weapon inventories, January 2023. Source: SIPRI

2. Although the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has again underlined the importance of the Eastern front of the alliance, the main effort of NATO has moved in an anti-Chinese key in the Indo-Pacific. Europe shares the interest in that geographical area, but ever since the signing of the AUKUS, that is, the Trilateral Pact between Austria, the USA and the UK of 2021, which excluded France.¹⁶ In light of this, it is clear that NATO's greatest power is acting individually in protecting its interests even when they coincide with those of its European allies. The EU, although the Indo-Pacific pivot is fundamental, does not have the military capabilities and the political unit suitable to deal with multi-frontal employment (in this case maritime), especially when geographical areas closer (such as the African coast) NATO is putting them in the background. Still, they are of primary importance to the Union.

¹⁶ Calcagno, E. (2021) - Aukus: il fronte anglosassone nel Pacifico che esclude la Francia. Istituto Affari Internazionali. Dissertation.

8.3 PSDC Mission and Troops

8.3.1 Troops and Mobility

“The much-touted flagship rapid deployment capacity (RDC) project in the crisis management area will be a modular force of up to 5.000 personnel, consisting of modified EU battlegroups and additional forces combining the forces and capabilities of Member States According to the Compass, rather than being a single force, it should consist of different components (air, land, maritime) and should include strategic enablers – such as air transport capabilities – depending on the operational scenario. Its purpose will be to rapidly respond to imminent crises outside the EU and can used in different operational scenarios such as 'initial entry, reinforcement, or as a reserve force to secure an exit.’”¹⁷

The RDC is the EU Battlegroups heir project (EU BGs), which are defined as Multinational, military units of up to 1500 personnel each, meant to quickly respond to emerging crises around the world. Since 2007, the BGs have remained almost unused because they suffered from a lack of financial solidarity and the very use of the unit. Faced with a crisis, the mobilization of the BGs should have obtained a unanimous vote. This means that a member could exercise its veto right to evade liability for costs. The difference therefore between RDC and BGs is not only in composition (from 1500 to a maximum of 5000 units) or in expressible capabilities. According to the SC, the RDC will enjoy a common fund and the rotation of the troops will be longer (about 6 months). The gap is in the way of use and access to the common fund that to date have not been specified due to a lack of agreements between nations.

In October 2023, the first EU-level military crisis management exercise with a live exercise (LIVEX) component took place, testing rapid crisis response capabilities by joining 19 member states and 2800 men from various national armed forces¹⁸. According to the established program, the RDC will reach full operational capacity in 2025. The question posed by scholars is how 5000 Personnel coming from EU member states can be the "*executive arm*" of a European defence system sufficient to support the

¹⁷ Clap, S. (2022) – Implementation of the Strategic Compass – Opportunities, challenges and timelines. EPRS. Document for Observers.

¹⁸ (2023). EU Crisis Management Military Exercise 2023 MILEX/LIVEX 23- Strategic Compass. Document for Observers.

LOA established by the SC. At least, the target number for the RDC should be between 7000 and 10000 troops in total, according to the EU Parliament's position.¹⁹

8.3.2 PSDC missions

The debate on the real effectiveness of the missions launched by the EU was revived with the approval of the SC. The main difficulties that over the years have given a setback to the missions, especially military, in CSDP dress are to be identified in the difference between the members of their own strategic cultures concerning the use of force. This difference, combined with that of the interests of individuals, has led to the inadequate, if not lacking, formation of military assets. For example, "EUNAVFOR MED Irini" fully operational from 2020 and recently reconfirmed until 2025, is a purely military naval operation with legal basis in Articles 42 and 43 of the EU Treaty²⁰. The mission is to implement the UN arms embargo on Libya. The weaknesses, inherited from the previous "EUNAVFOR MED Sophia", are the impossibility of acting in Libyan territory due to a lack of Libyan consensus, due to an approach of Tripoli in Ankara culminated with the bilateral redefinition of EEZs at the expense of EU countries (Cyprus). The result is the ineffectiveness of the operation, aggravated by the political division in this regard between the EU members themselves, as well as the scarcity of naval assets available. To make the situation worse, the difficult relations with Turkey were exacerbated when the naval assets of Irini faced Turkish military ships.

If we exclude all those civilian and training missions, to which the failure in Afghanistan has proved useless after more than twenty years of "*mentoring operations*", the EU has failed to be effective in the Mediterranean Sea. In the largest military operation that the EU has ever undertaken, the aforementioned weaknesses have emerged completely, undermining and rendering vain the very essence of the European mission.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Servizio Studi Ufficio Politica Estera e Difesa (2023) - Conferenza interparlamentare sulla politica estera e di sicurezza comune (PESC) e sulla politica di sicurezza e di difesa comune (PSDC). Madrid. Document for Observers.

9. Discussion of Result (pros and cons) and personal Conclusions

The question with which the study started was whether the CS represents a response to conflicts around the EU or a real radical change in security. In light of what has emerged, beyond good intentions, it does not translate into either. It cannot be denied, as has been pointed out, that the actions taken in favour of Ukraine are considerable. In this context, the EU has demonstrated a united front in supporting Kyiv. Together with historical partners, such as the USA, supplies and economic aid, together with the training missions launched (such as EUMAM) have shown the world the concrete will to support the much-publicised Sharing Values. The SC is therefore a significant first step towards a more rational European defence system. The first real LIVEX military exercise and the desire to move to a voting system within the CSDP that exploits the c.d. "*Bridging Clauses*" represent a significant element of growth never seen since the Maastricht Treaty to date.

On the other hand, it is undeniable that it was approved stripped of all those more courageous ideas, removed or weakened because of the differences between members. The slow process affects the effectiveness and timeliness of the actions taken. Therefore, as already described for Poland, the members of the Union chose different paths, compromising the success of the project born after the aggression against Ukraine. The funds allocated, while encouraging cooperation within the European institutions, are of little account when compared to the total expenditure of all EU countries. In addition, the CSDP missions, whose effectiveness suffers from the limitations described in the previous paragraphs, do not respond in any way to the LOA that the EU has imposed itself: proposing the same model could represent a further waste of resources. Finally, to list the "cons" that have emerged, relations with partners (both state and international bodies) should be subordinated to European interests. This means that NATO, for example, must no longer be the bulwark of European defence, but the EU must necessarily become the backbone of NATO in Europe.

*“We need to be able to act rapidly and robustly whenever a crisis erupts, with partners if possible and alone when necessary”.*²¹

In my view, not only military but also purely political-strategic, a transition to a supranational system leaving the functionalist-intergovernmental system. Europe is surrounded: by illegal immigration, conflicts, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, to name but a few, represent power gaps created by the EU and, unfortunately, state actors (China and Turkey for example) and not, exploit to increase their influence and specific weight in the international arena.

²¹ Borrell, J. (2021) – A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. Document for Observes.

10. Annex

10.1 List of Abbreviations

1. AIFV: Armoured Infantry Vehicle
2. AUKUS: Australia United Kingdom and United States
3. BGs: Battlegroups
4. CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy
5. EDF: European Defence Fund
6. EES: European External Action Service
7. EPRS: European Parliamentary Research Service
8. ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
9. EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone
10. EU: European Union
11. EUMAM: EU Military Assistance Mission in Support of Ukraine
12. GDP: Gross Domestic Product
13. HR/VP: High Representative / Vice President
14. LIVEX: Live Exercise
15. LOA: Level of Ambitions
16. MPCC: Military Planning and Conduct Capability
17. NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
18. PESCO: Permanent Structured Cooperation
19. RDC: Rapid Deployment Capacity
20. SC: Strategic Compass
21. TEC: Treaty Establishing the European Community
22. UNITO: Università degli Studi di Torino
23. US: United States

10.2 List of Figures

Figure 1. (page 9). Possible areas for defence cooperation and their corresponding cost reduction. The table displays savings calculated based on the EPRS study in areas where there could be potential savings in European expenditures on defence and security. - European Parliamentary Research Service (2019) - Europe's two trillion euro dividend: Mapping the Cost of Non-Europe, 2019-24. Document for Observer

Figure 2. (page 10) Indicates in individual national strategies what is labelled as a threat by EU members. Cristiani, D. & Alcaro, R. (2023) – Focus euroatlantico. Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Volume 1/2023.

Figure 3. (page 12) Global nuclear weapon inventories, January 2023. Source: SIPRI

10.3 List of Tables

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
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11. Affidavit

I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on.

I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarise, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them.

I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay, exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad. These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e. if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.



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2nd Lt. RN f.(b.) Gabriele De Giuseppe

Turin, Italy in November 2023